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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
- Conclusion
Professor Mechem in his treatise on the law of agency recognized
the application of apparent agency to all cases, whether founded in
tort or contract. He observes that "Reliance upon the appearances,
however, does not ordinarily induce the assault, slander, trespass, or
negligent injury, and the cases must be very rare, if any, in which it
could be an element". 31  With this the writer is inclined to agree. A
diligent search of the case books has failed to reveal any other cases
or torts but those founded on the theory of negligence.3 2 However,
the author is confident that, in the future, actions will arise holding
apparent principals liable on other torts as well. They will fill in the
last gaps in the apparent agency-tort liability scheme.
ARTHUR BENNETT.
VALIDITY OF CONTRACT BASED UPON BREACH OF PRIOR EXISTING
CONTRACT
A contract represents the legal obligations of all parties thereto
and defines their legal rights." Any interference with the legal rights
is remediable at law or in equity.2  And the law goes further. It
protects the contracting parties against interference by third parties
not in privity with the contract.3 This protection is of comparatively
modern origin although it sprang from the early master and servant
relationship,4 spread to specialty contracts of a personal nature 5 and,
at present, is applied to all types of contracts.6 The courts have defi-
nitely classified interference with and procurance of a breach of con-
31 1 MEcHEm, AGENCY § 724.
32 (1931) 29 MICH. L. REv. 640.
1 WHITNEY, LAW OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1937) § 1.
2 Id. §12.
3 Blumenthal v. United States, 30 F. (2d) 247 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929), cert.
denied, 279 U. S. 847, 49 Sup. Ct. 345 (1929) ; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555
(1871); Union Car Advertising Co. v. Collier, 263 N. Y. 386, 189 N. E. 463
(1934); Fradus Contracting Co. v. Taylor, 201 App. Div. 298, 194 N. Y. Supp.
386 (1st Dept. 1922) ; Axelrod v. 77 Park Ave. Corp., 225 App. Div. 557, 234
N. Y. Supp. 27 (1st Dept. 1929).
4 Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract (1923) 36 HARv. L. REv. 663, 665.
5 Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & B1. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853); Bowen v.
Hall, 6 Q. B. D. 333 (1881).
6 Employing Printers Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, 50 S. E. 353
(1905) ; Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608, 52 N. E. 924 (1898) ; Beekman v.
Marsters, 195 Mass. 205, 80 N. E. 817 (1907) ; Lamb v. Cheney, 227 N. Y. 418,
125 N. E. 817 (1920) ; Temperton v. Russell (1893) 1 Q. B. 715; Note (1923)
36 HARv. L. REv. 663, 671.
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tract by a third party as a tort.7 The latest problem relevant to this
subject is the legality of a bargain requiring the breach of contract
with a third person. When the New York Court of Appeals was
faced with that question in Budd v. Morning Telegraph,8 it rendered
a decision that has created considerable confusion as to the status of
the law in New York on that issue. In this case, the plaintiff, Budd,
sued for a breach of contract. Budd had been under a three-year
contract with the Daily Racing Form Publishing Co. which defendant
knew. However, defendant, a competitor of Racing Form, offered
him a contract on better terms, and assured him that the agreement
with Racing Form was not binding, and that the defendant would as-
sume all liability if any occurred from the breach. Budd then
breached his contract and entered into one with the defendant. Sub-
sequently, he was discharged by the defendant, and brought an action
for the breach. The Appellate Division held that it was error to
dismiss the complaint for fraud as plaintiff presented a prima fade
case. There was no wrong on the part of the plaintiff in breaching
the first contract, and no fraud was established. Therefore the par-
ties were not in pari delicto, and the contract was enforceable. The
Appellate Division did not attempt to support its findings by any-
law, although the dissenting opinion clearly showed that the law in
New York was to the contrary. The Court of Appeals upheld the
decision without rendering an opinion.,
ii
However, before judgment is passed on the wisdom of this re-
cent decision on the question, it is necessary to search into the back-
ground of the law upon which it is based. As previously stated, a
7Angle v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R. R., 151 U. S. 1, 14 Sup. Ct. 240
(1894); Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 38, 36 Sup. Ct. 7 (1915); Hitchman
Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 252, 38 Sup. Ct. 65 (1917);
Sklaisky v. A. & P. Tea Co., 47 F. (2d) 662 (1931) ; Employing Printing Club
v. Dr. Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, 50 S. E. 353 (1905) ; Kock v. Burgess, 167 Iowa
727, 733 (1914); Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt, 120 Md. 381, 392,
87 AtI. 927 (1913) ; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 567 (1871) ; Berry v.
Donavan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603 (1905) ; Bixby v. Dunlop, 56 N. H. 456
(1876); Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N. J. L. 729, 65 Atl. 165 (1905);
Caughey v. Smith, 47 N. Y. 244 (1872); Lawyer v. Fritcher, 130 N. Y. 239,
29 N. E. 267 (1891); Lamb v. Cheney & Son, 227 N. Y. 418, 125 N. E. 817
(1920) ; Weinberg v. Irwinessie, 225 App. Div. 241, 232 N. Y. Supp. 443 (2d
Dept. 1929) ; Stewart v. Simpson, 1 Wend. 376 (N. Y. 1828) ; Haight v Badge-
ley, 15 Barb. 499 (N. Y. 1853) ; Covert v. Gray, 34 How. Pr. 450 (N. Y. 1865).
Contra: Only where the act of invasion is itself a legal tort, i.e., fraud, libel,
slander, violence or actionable threats, then there is an action for damages,
Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578, 33 Pac. 492 (1893); Chambers v. Baldwin, 91
Ky. 121, 15 S. W. 57 (1891); Marsh v. Billings, 7 Cush. 322 (Mass. 1851);
Tally v. Cantwell, 30 Mo. App. 524 (1888); Rice v. Manley, 66 N. Y. 82
(1876) ; Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend. 385 (N. Y. 1829).
s241 App. Div. 142, 271 N. Y. Supp. 538 (1st Dept. 1938), aff'd, 265 N. Y.
639, 193 N. E. 423 (1938).
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contract represents certain property rights, and the invasion of them
is a legal wrong.9 The majority of the states have agreed that such
an invasion is a tort.10 Basically, the question involved in the Budd
case resolves itself around the point as to whether a tort exists where
a prior contract is breached, in order to fashion the contract in the
action. If the inducement is proven to be a tort, can the courts con-
done it by enforcing the later contract? That is the question an-
swered by the New York Court of Appeals. In order to establish a
tort arising from the breach of one contract by a second one, certain
factors must necessarily be present. Primarily, the original contract
must be valid and enforceable." There must be an intent by the
tort-feasor to prevent performance 1 2 of the first obligation. This in-
tent is presumed by proof of the most essential element of the tort,
knowledge of the existence of the contract which is breached.13 Com-
bined with these factors is the fourth element of malice which is gen-
erally implied from the act of interference. 14 The malice required is
the intentional doing of a harmful act without justification. It does
not consist of spite or ill will.'5 It is not necessary to prove actual
9 Second National Bank v. Samuel & Sons, 273 U. S. 720, 47 Sup. Ct. 110(1926); Central Metal Products Corp. v. O'Brien, 284 Fed. 850 (C. C. A. 6th,
1922) ; Cook v. Wilson, 108 Misc. 438, 178 N. Y. Supp. 463 (1919); Vail-Ballou
Press v. Casey, 125 Misc. 689, 212 N. Y. Supp. 113 (1925) ; Meltzer v. Kaminer,
131 Misc. 813, 227 N. Y. Supp. 459 (1927); Exchange Teleg. Co. v. Gregory(1896) 1 Q. B. 147.
Right in an existing employment is a property right. Sorenson v. Chevro-
let Motor Co., 171 Minn. 260, 214 N. W. 754 (1930) ; Auburn Draying Co. v.
Wardell, 227 N. Y. 1, 124 N. E. 97 (1919). Contra: Erdman v. Mitchell, 207
Pa. 79, 56 At. 327 (1905).
10 See note 7, supra.
11 Ford Motor Co. v. Union Motor Sales Co., 244 Fed. 156 (C. C. A. 6th,
1917) ; Campbell v. Cooper, 34 N. H. 49 (1856) ; Rich v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R.,
87 N. Y. 382 (1882); Sykes v. Dixon, 9 Ad. & El. 693, 112 Eng. Rep. 1374(1839).
12 Sweeney v. Smith, 171 Fed. 645 (C. C. A. 3d, 1909), cert. denied, 215
U. S. 600, 30 Sup. Ct. 400 (1909) ; N. Y. Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transport
Corp.,,34 F. (2d) 639 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929). See also Wissmath Packing Co. v.
Miss. River Power Co., 179 Iowa 1309, 162 N. W. 846 (1917) ; L. R. A. 1917F,
790.
13 Rice-Brown Lumber Co. v. Fleetwood, 134 Ark. 340, 203 S. W. 692(1918); Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 171 Minn. 260, 214 N. W. 754(1930); Denver v. Smith, 89 N. J. Eq. 339, 104 Atl. 717 (1918); Lamb v.
Cheney & Son, 227 N. Y. 418, 125 N. E. 817 (1920) ; Hornstein v. Podwitz,254 N. Y. 443, 173 N. E. 674 (1930); Goodman Bros., Inc. v. Ashton, 211 App.
Div. 769, 208 N. Y. Supp. 83 (1st Dept. 1925); Bolivar v. Monnat, 232 App.
Div. 33, 248 N. Y. Supp. 722 (4th Dept. 1931); Thompson Co. v. Winchell,
et al., 244 App. Div. 195, 278 N. Y. Supp. 781 (1st Dept. 1935).
14 Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N. J. L. 729, 65 Atl. 165 (1906) ; Lamb
v. Cheney & Son, 227 N. Y. 418, 125 N. E. 817 (1920) ; Hornstein v. Podwitz,
254 N. Y. 443, 173 N. E. 674 (1930) ; E. L. Husting Co. v. Coca Cola Co., 205
Wis. 356, 237 N. W. 85 (1931).
15 Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt, 120 Md. 381, 392, 87 Atl. 927(1913); Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 122 Mass. 19 (1877); Quinn v. Leathern
(1901) A. C. 495.
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malice in order to establish a cause of action.16 Lastly, the breach
must be proven together with the actual damages suffered by the in-
jured party.' 7 Proof of these elements establishes the tort.
But does that mean that a contract drawn upon these elements
is not valid? Certain factual situations serve to illustrate the prob-
lems involved and give a better understanding of the questions to be
answered. Where A and B have a valid contract between them and
X, with knowledge of the contract, maliciously induces B to contract
with him for the same purpose with intent to harm A, can such a
bargain be enforced at the expense of the previous agreement? The
primary obligation between A and B is valid. X intends deliberately
to harm A by preventing performance. He has knowledge of the
existing contract, and his malice need not be implied from the facts,
but is express. Execution of the second contract is sufficient breach
of the first obligation from which A can prove his damages. X's
conduct in every respect shows him to be a tort-feasor. His contract
is the element creating the harm, yet the Court of Appeals would
have such a contract enforced.
Assume a second set of facts similar in every respect, except that
X only desires to acquire the object of the prior contract for his own
use and benefit. This situation does not give as clear, a picture of
the perpetration of a tort. In fact, many decisions seek to justify
such an act of interference under the heading of "competition". Such
exponents of this theory state that to prevent a man from driving a
good bargain at the expense of his competitor would be to stifle com-
petition and freedom of trade.' 8 It is true that competition should
not be stifled, but does that justify an invasion of another person's
rights? This theory fails when one important fact is recognized, that
is, knowledge of the first contract. Accidental injury is seldom ac-
tionable. But an incidental breach cannot be claimed by the party
interfering when the inducer knows that he will breach a contract to
effectuate his own ends.' 9 It is the knowledge that one is doing a
16 Said v. Butt (1920) 3 K. B. 497.
17 Hodge v. Meyer, 248 U. S. 565, 39 Sup. Ct. 9 (1918) ; Chysley v. Atkin-
son, 23 Fla. 206, 1 So. 934 (1877) ; Butterfield v. Ashley, 6 Cush. 249 (Mass.
1850); Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205, 80 N. E. 817 (1907).
18 Citizens Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power
Co., 171 Fed. 553, 560, 561 (1909) ; Peters v. Lord, 18 Conn. 337 (1847) ; Jones
v. Blocher, 43 Ga. 331 (1871); Kerr v. Du Pree, 35 Ga. App. 122, 132 S. E.
393 (1926) ; Butterfield v. Ashley, 6 Cush. 249 (Mass. 1850) ; Walker v. Cronin,
107 Mass. 555 (1871); McGurk v. Conenwitt, 199 Mass. 457, 85 N. E. 571(1908); Woody v. Brush, 178 App. Div. 698, 165 N. Y. Supp. 867 (2d Dept
1917); Knapp v. Penfield, 143 Misc. 132, 250 N. Y. Supp. 41 (1932); Biber
Bros. News Co. v. N. Y. Evening Post, 144 Misc. 405, 258 N. Y. Supp. 31(1932) ; Johnson v. Hitchcock, 15 Johns. 185 (N. Y. 1818) ; Garcia Sugar v.
N. Y. Coffee & Sugar Co., - Misc. -- , 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 532 (1938); In re
Curtiss' Will, 140 Misc. 185, 250 N. Y. Supp. 146 (1931).
19 Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205, 80 N. E. 817 (1907) ; Campbell v.
Gates, 236 N. Y. 457, 141 N. E. 914 (1923); Affiliated Ladies Apparel v.
National Dress Mfrs. Ass'n, 164 Misc. 785, 299 N. Y. Supp. 914, 916 (1937) ;
1940]
ST. JOHN'S *LAW REVIEW
wrongful act without justification that infers the malice and creates
the tort.
In a third situation, similar in all respects to the first except that
X has no knowledge nor intent to harm A, it cannot be said that a
tort exists. Testing the facts with the elements of the tort, no wrong
can be shown. It is true that the rights of A have been invaded, but
there is no intent to interfere, no knowledge of any rights being in-
vaded, and, consequently, malice is lacking. It is damnum absque
injuria.20
What is the distinction between the three cases? It is in con-
sidering the elements of knowledge and malice which are basic in es-
tablishing the tort. They are dependent factors. Formerly, English
courts insisted on establishing malice as an independent fact in order
to prove the tort,21 but the later decisions acknowledged that the tort
was not based on malicious intention, but on the grounds that a vio-
lation of a legal right committed knowingly is a cause of action.22
Subsequently, this was followed in the United States,23 and today
knowledge is the important element.2 4 It is from knowledge of the
prior contract that malice is now inferred. The word, "malicious",
required in the complaint for a tort action for procuring a breach of
contract, means an intentional doing of a wrongful act without justi-
fication. It does not consist of spite or ill-will.25 It is malice in the
strictly legal sense. Thus a conscious intention to appropriate that
which belongs to another would be a correct definition of the malice
involved herein.2 6  Knowledge creates the malice. In the first ex-
ample, both knowledge and malice were present and no discussion
is needed to further the tort. In the second example no malice can
be proven except that knowledge is admitted. This knowledge forms
the malice, as the act of interference in another's rights is done inten-
tionally without just cause or excuse.2 7 The third example is devoid
of knowledge and malice although there is a right invaded. The tort
requires knowledge and malice, which must arise out of the knowl-
edge or be expressed. Invasion of a legal right alone is not suffi-
cient to give rise to a cause of action.28
Jones v. Stanley, 76 N. C. 355 (1877); Skinner & Co. v. Shew & Co. (1893)
1 Ch. 413; Quinn v. Leathern (1901) A. C. 495, 510. See note 13, supra.
20 Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578, 33 Pac. 492 (1893) ; Baulier v. MacCauley,
91 Ky. 135, 15 S. W. 60 (1891) ; McCann v. Wolff, 28 Mo. App. 447 (1888);
Ashley v. Dixon, 48 N. Y. 430 (1872).
21 Quinn v. Leathem (1901) A. C. 495.
22 Said v. Butt (1920) 3 K. B. 497. See note 21, supra.
23 See note 13, PuLra.
24 Rice-Brown Lumber Co. v. Fleetwood, 134 Ark. 340, 203 S. W. 692
(1918).
25 Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N. J. L. 729, 65 Atl. 165 (1905) ; Horn-
stein v. Podwitz, 254 N. Y. 443, 173 N. E. 674 (1930). See note 15, supra.26 Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract (1923) 36 HARv. L. REV. 663.
27 Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 122 Mass. 19 (1877).28 Hornstein v. Podwitz, 254 N. Y. 443, 173 N. E. 674 (1930) ; Van Wyck
v. Manning, 256 App. Div. 256, 9 N.Y. S. (2d) 684, 687 (2d Dept. 1939). '
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III
Only one step further need be taken to show that a bargain, or
agreement, which requires for its execution the breach of an existing
contract, is illegal. The act of procuring a breach is a tort.29  A con-
tract based on that act cannot be legal as the consideration is illegal,30
and the acts called for are illegal. The parties to the second contract
are both guilty of wrongful acts. One has by the contract procured
the breach of an existing contract, which act has been shown to be a
tort. The other party has breached a contract and broken faith with
his promisee which, while not a tort, is still a wrong. The injured
party has a cause of action against both or either.31
If either of the parties to the second contract so formed breach
it, their only hope for remedy is at law as equity Will not take juris-
diction.32  The Budd case gave recognition of a remedy at law, but
the weight of opinion is to the contrary.33 A breach of contract is a
legal wrong and the courts will not aid one who bases his cause of
action on such an illegal act.3 4 Nor will they aid a tort-feasor to per-
petrate his misdoings. It has been the policy of the courts to leave
parties equally at fault where they stand as the law will not aid either
party to an illegal contract to enforce it against the other.8 Also,
29 See note 7, supra. EDGAR & EDGAR, LAW OF TORTS (3d ed. 1936) § 141.
30 Roberts v. Criss, 266 Fed. 296 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920) ; Hocking Valley Ry.
v. Barbour, 190 App. Div. 341, 179 N. Y. Supp. 810 (1st Dept. 1920); 83 A. L.
R. 32, 44; 9 Cyr. 468.
31 Second National Bank of Toledo v. Samuel & Sons, Inc., 12 F. (2d)
963 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 720, 47 Sup. Ct. 110 (1926) ;
Motley Green & Co. v. Detroit Steel & Spring Co., 161 Fed. 389 (C. C. A. 2d,
1908); Posner Co. v. Jackson, 223 N. Y. 325, 331, 119 N. E. 573, 574 (1918) ;
Gonzales v. Kentucky Deiby Co., 197 App. Div. 277, 189 N. Y. Supp. 783 (2d
Dept. 1921), aff'd, 233 N. Y. 607, 135 N. E. 938 (1922) ; Hornstein v. Podwitz,
254 N. Y. 443, 449, 173 N. E. 674 (1930) ; Note (1930) 30 CoL L. Rlv. 232.
Contra: Weinberg v. Irwinessie Holding Corp., 225 App. Div. 241, 232 N. Y.
Supp. 443 (2d Dept. 1928).
32 He who comes into equity must do so with clean hands. Harms &
Francis, Day & Hunter v. Stein, 229 Fed. 42, 49 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916), rev'g, 222
Fed. 581 (1915) ; Sharpless-liendler Ice Cream Co. v. Davis, 17 Del. Ch. 161,
151 Atl. 261 (1930).33 Woodstock Iron Co. v. Richmond & D. Extension Co., 129 U. S. 643,
8 Sup. Ct. 402 (1889); Foley Mfg. Co. v. Sierra-Nevada Lumber Co., 172 Fed.
197 (C. C. A. 7th, 1909); Wegham v. Kellifer, 215 Fed. 289 (C. C. A. 6th,
1914) ; Moody v. Niewmark, 121 Cal. 446, 53 Pac. 944 (1898) ; Ely v. Kings-
Richardson Co., 265 Ill. 148, 106 N. E. 619 (1914) ; Morgan v. Ballard, 1 A. K.
March 558 (Ky. 1819) ; Weld v. Lancaster, 56 Me. 456 (1868) ; New Haven
Road Constr. Co. v. Long, 269 Mass. 16, 168 N. E. 161 (1921) ; Driver v. Smith,
89 N. J. Eq. 339, 104 Atl. 717 (1918); Cobb v. Win. Kinefick Co., 23 Okla.
440, 100 Pac. 545 (1909); Jackson v. Duchaire, 3 T. R. 551, 100 Eng. Rep. 727
(1790). Contra: Biggers v. Matthews, 147 N. C. 299, 61 S. E. 55 (1908);
Benford v. Sanner, 40 Pa. 9 (1861); No. Wisconsin Coop. Tobacco Pool v.
Bekkedal, 182 Wis. 571, 197 N. W. 936 (1924).
34 Hocking Valley Ry. v. Barbour, 190 App. Div. 341, 179 N. Y. Supp. 810
(1st Dept. 1920) ; WHITNEY, LAW OF Co zRAcTs (3d ed. 1937) 167, § 62.35 Woodstock Iron Co. v. Richmond & Danville Extension Co., 129 U. S.
643, 9 Sup. Ct. 402 (1888) ; Coverly v. Terminal Warehouse, 85 App.- Div. 488,
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contracting to commit a breach of an existing contract is an agree-
ment to commit a tort and the courts cannot enforce such an agree=
ment.3 6 Another strong reason against enforcement is public policy.3 7
To permit enforcement would be to encourage persons to breach their
contracts to accomplish similar unconscionable and unbusinesslike acts
even though they originally made the contract freely and honestly.
To thus support a contract based on acts that are morally unsound,
against common honesty, and are proven torts would be to encourage
such wrongdoing. The mere fact that the contract is partially exe-
cuted will not take it out of the general rule.38  Neither party can
enforce against the other a contract made between themselves to in-
jure a third person in fraud of the law.39 Such an agreement has
always been held illegal and fraudulent as against public policy. 40
A contract is protected and enforced at law, not because it is a moral
obligation but because it is a civil obligation, and, to entitle it to be
enforced, the contract must be legal, as an illegal contract creates no
obligation.
41
How does the Court of Appeals rationalize the Budd case with
this evident weight of authority? The decision is utterly lacking in
support by any authority and is based on two theories, one of justifi-
cation in that the original contract did not intend Budd to go to Cali-
fornia to perform it. The other was that Budd was not committing
a legal wrong in breaking his contract. In support of justification,
the evidence is all too weak and the point is not stressed. But if Budd
did not believe that his contract called for services wherever desired,
his letters and the fact he performed about sixteen months of the three-
year contract, are to the contrary. It was only when he had assur-
83 N. Y. Supp. 369 (1st Dept. 1903), aff'd, 178 N. Y. 602, 70 N. E. 1097
(1904); Hart v. City Theatres Co., 215 N. Y. 322, 109 N. E. 497 (1915);
Municipal Metallic Bed Mfg. Corp. v. Dobbs, 253 N. Y. 313, 171 N. E. 75
(1930) ; Kountze v. Flanagan, 64 Hun 635, 19 N. Y. Supp. 33 (1892) ; Hocking
Valley Ry. v. Barbour, 190 App. Div. 341, 179 N. Y. Supp. 810 (1st Dept.
1920); DiTomasso v. Loverro, 250 App. Div. 206, 293 N. Y. Supp. 912 (2d
Dept. 1937); Central N. Y. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Averill, 58 Misc. 59, 110 N. Y.
Supp. 273 (1908) ; Karpel v. Sands, 144 Misc. 392, 258 N. Y. Supp. 746 (1932).
36 Reiner v. North-American Newspaper Alliance, 259 N. Y. 250, 181 N. E.
561 (1932) ; RESTATEMENT, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 576.
37 Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258 (U. S. 1826) ; Moody v. Newmark,
121 Cal. 446, 53 Pac. 944 (1898) ; Rhoades v. Malta Vita, 149 Mich. 235, 112
N. W. 940 (1907) ; Baird v. Sheehan, 38 App. Div. 7, 56 N. Y. Supp. 228 (1st
Dept. 1899), affd, 166 N. Y. 631 60 N. E. 1107 (1901) ; Posner v. Jackson, 223
N. Y. 325, 119 N. E. 573 (19181; Reiner v. North American Newspaper Alli-
ance, 259 N. Y. 250, 181 N. E. 561 1932); Barry v. Mulhall, 162 App. Div.
749, 147 N. Y. Supp. 996 (1st Dept. 1914); Sprague v. Webb, 168 App. Div.
292, 153 N. Y. Supp. 1020 (1st Dept. 1915); Cahill v. Gilman, 84 Misc. 372,
146 N. Y. Supp. 224 (1914). See dissenting opinion Budd v. Morning Tele-
graph, 241 App. Div. 142, 271 N. Y. Supp. 538 (1st Dept. 1938), aff'd, 265
N. Y. 639, 193 N. E. 423 (1938).38 Kountze v. Flanagan, 64 Hun 635, 19 N. Y. Supp. 33 (1892).
39 Randall v. Howard, 2 Black 585 (U. S. 1862) ; 13 C. J. 343.
40 See note 37, supra.
41 Greenwald v. Barrett, 199 N. Y. 170, 92 N. E. 218 (1910).
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ance that he could breach it and still incur no liability, that he dared
to enter into the second contract. On the second theory, that such
breach is a private wrong between the injured party and the one who
breached the contract and not a matter involving public policy or in-
terests, it has been shown that breaching a contract is a matter of
public interest when all the facts are shown. In Reiner v. North
American Newspaper Alliance,42 Judge Pound holds that to breach a
contract is not of itself a tort; it is not a matter involving public pol-
icy, but only private rights, and a person has a right to breach a con-
tract and subject himself to damages. It is to be conceded that to
breach a contract is not a tort,43 and, on the surface, the Budd case
is strictly an action for such a breach. On the facts pleaded in the
Budd case, a cause of action is shown which must be brought to trial
in order to bring out all the additional facts involved. And in order
to render a true decision on the motion to dismiss the complaint, the
court must go beneath the surface and look at the facts. The con-
tract therein involved is basically one to commit a tort,44 and there is
little doubt that such a contract is illegal and does concern a question
of public policy.45 Judge Lehman, while partially agreeing with
Judge Pound, seeks to show the error in limiting the eyes of the
court to the facts at hand. He states:
"That problem should not be complicated by questions
of the form of action for breach of such duty or of whether
the narrow contractual duty supersedes the more general duty,
if it exists. Determination of public policy must rest upon
broad principles. If the plaintiff is seeking to recover compen-
sation for an act which constitutes a breach of a general duty
to refrain from willful, intentional injury to another without
just cause or excuse, then public policy must deny him
recovery."
Therefore a cause of action predicated on an illegal contract against
public policy cannot be enforced in the courts.
46
IV
Considering the Budd case, it is difficult to say what attitude
the New York courts will assume in the future. Other jurisdictions
have taken cognizance of the problem, and the majority opinion is
that a bargain requiring the breach of an existing contract with harm
to a third party is unenforceable as against public policy.47  If the
42 259 N. Y. 250, 181 N. E. 561 (1932).
43 Rich v. N. Y. Central & Hudson R. R., 87 N. Y. 382 (1882).
44 Reiner v. North-American Newspaper Alliance Co., 259 N. Y. 250, 181
N. E. 561 (1932).
4 5 WHITNEY, LAW OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1937) 167, § 62.
46 See note 35, supra.
47 Roberts v. Criss, 266 Fed. 296 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920) ; Moody v. Newmark,
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Budd case is followed in New York, then it must be said that New
York will follow a minority rule. The law in New York involving
the principles herein discussed placed this state among the majority
of those adopting the rule that a party inducing a breach of contract is
guilty of committing an illegal act 4 8 and that contracts based on a tort
may not be enforced.4 9 A further point to be added which has not been
discussed yet, is that the subsequent contract is a fraud against the
third party 50 and is a tort, independent of the inducement to breach
the contract.
In Reiner v. North Anwrican Newspaper Alliance 1 the issues
are almost identical to the problem herein, but the court based its
opinion on the question of fraud and avoided answering this question.
Judge Hubbs and two other judges decided that the contract was one
to corrimit a tort and as such unenforceable. Judge Pound specifi-
cally denies that it is a tort and that public policy is involved, but
states that it is a fraud on a third party and as such unenforceable.
He does not base his opinion on the breach at all. Judge Crane simi-
larly refused to recognize the tort but upheld the decision, stating
that the courts will not aid a fraudulent scheme that is inherently
against public policy in that it is based on immoral and unconscion-
able acts. It was only Judge Lehman who approached the question
that public policy forbids the enforcement of a contract calling for a
breach of an already existing agreement. Recognizing the basic ques-
tion present as to whether enforcement of the second contract is
against public policy, he states:
"Even now the law has evolved at least to the point where
on ground of public policy it should refuse to a suitor all rem-
edy upon a contract which could be performed only by the
suitor's using a contract made with a third party as an in-
strument of injury to the third party. 4: * * Any broader rule
indicated in this opinion is intended only as a warning that
other contracts or acts, in breach of contracts made with third
parties, may similarly outrage public policy."
Although various opinions are to be found in the Reiner case, they
all ultimately conclude that the second contract is unenforceable.
Yet when five of those same six judges are faced with almost
the self-same facts as they are in the Budd case, they abandon their
121 Cal. 446, 53 Pac. 944 (1898) ; Rhoades v. Malta Vita Pure Food Co., 149
Mich. 235, 112 N. W. 940 (1907); Hocking Valley Ry. v. Barbour, 190 App.
Div. 341, 179 N. Y. Supp. 810 (1st Dept. 1920); Attridge v. Pembroke, 235
App. Div. 101, 256 N. Y. Supp. 257 (4th Dept. 1932); Wanderess Hockey Club
v. Johnson (1913) 18 B. C. 367. See also Sharpless-Hendler Ice Cream Co. v.
Davis, 17 Del. Ch. 161, 151 Atl. 261 (1930) ; Driver v. Smith, 89 N. J. Eq. 339,
104 Atl. 717 (1918) ; Cobb v. Kenefick, 23 Okla. 440, 100 Pac. 545 (1909).
48 See note 7, supra.
49 See note 36, supra.50 RhSTATEmENT, LAW OF CoNTRAcTs § 576.
51259 N. Y. 250, 181 N. E. 561 (1932).
NOTES AND COMMENT
ideas and can see no wrong in a contract which is intended to harm
a third party. The only illegal act being that defendant by his in-
ducement committed a tort, as plaintiff's acts can only have harmed
the third party and no one else. The contract is not one to commit a
tort; it is not a fraud on the third party; it is not an immoral and
fraudulent agreement against public policy, it is a valid and enforce-
able contract. Perhaps the reason for this obvious reversal of opin-
ion, contrary to the weight of decision, is that the question reached
the court on a motion to dismiss the complaint. The complaint does
state a cause of action and it would only be on the trial that all the
pertinent facts would be brought out.
These two recent cases represent the law in New York. Which
one will be followed, it is difficult to say. The Budd case is distin-
guished from the Reiner case by showing that fraud alone defeats
the plaintiff in the latter case whereas no fraud is present to prevent
Budd from suing. Even to concede that a breach of a contract stand-
ing alone is only a private wrong, does not give the proper answer.
When that breach is interwoven into a tort, it cannot be separated.
The defendant was guilty of a wrong unquestionably, yet his illegal
act cannot be separated from plaintiff's act in breaching his contract
with a third party. They are not two separate acts but are one, hav-
ing one result, i.e., harm to a third party. The acts of the plaintiff
were as unconscionable as those of the defendant inducer. Any acts
intended to harm a third party are illegal, 52 and it is this combina-
tion of acts that creates the injury. Defendant's inducement would
not be the basis of any tort, if plaintiff had not acted with him in
order that they together could form a second contract.
It is apparent that the better law should follow Judge Lehman's
opinion in the Reiner case, and undoubtedly future decisions involv-
ing the validity of a contract which requires in its performance the
breach of a contract already existing between one of the parties with
a third person will limit the rule of the Budd case.
In Roberts v. Criss, the federal courts have properly adjudicated
the question involved herein. 53 In that case the courts refused to en-
force a second contract on the grounds that it was against public pol-
icy and that the consideration given for it was illegal. This is ap-
parently the line of reasoning that should be followed in future
decisions as it properly states what the law should be.
Where a contract has for an integral part of its consideration
the breach of a prior inconsistent contract between one of the con-
tracting parties and a stranger, it is based upon an illegal considera-
tion, and is void and unenforceable by either party thereto. More-
over, when the breach of the prior contract is accompanied by a
52 13 C. J. 343.
53 Roberts v. Criss, 266 Fed. 296 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920) (action to enforce a
business contract which involved the breach of an existing contract between the
pronisee and the stock exchange. Held, the second contract being illegal and
tortious was unenforceable).
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tortious act or "wrong" to the other contracting party, the wrongdoer
will be precluded from profiting by an enforcement of his second
contract.
5 4
ROBERT M. POST.
PICKETING-SCOPE OF RELIEF UNDER THE NEW YORK
ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
I
It is most interesting to note the first judicial dispositions of
cases involving organization to secure wage increases and picketing.
In 1835 a combination of bootmakers, to raise their wages, was in-
dicted for peaceable co-operation for the purpose of maintaining the
rate of wages. The court held that such combinations and confedera-
cies to enhance or reduce the price of labor were injurious to trade,
and monopolistic in aspect.' Business was upheld as a property right
which equity would enjoin from injury.2 In another action involving
the right to picket, the court similarly enjoined the defendant on the
ground that it was a public obstruction and a private nuisance in
violation of the right to do business freely.3 judicial attitude was
rapidly changing, and, towards the end of the century, we find the first
assertions that combination, appeal, persuasion,4 and picketing 5 are
legal means of obtaining larger wages. Legislative recognition fos-
tered this change, and in 1870 it was enacted that the "orderly and
peaceable assembling or co-operation of persons employed in any pro-
fession, trade or handicraft, for the purpose of securing an advance in
the rate of wages or compensation" is now permitted.6 Thus the
common law actions of conspiracy 7 and enticing away of workmen 8
54 11 A. L. R. 698; RESTATEMENT, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 576.
1 People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 2, 18 (N. Y. 1835) ("He may say that he
will not make coarse boots for less than one dollar but he has no right to say
that no other mechanic shall make them for less").
2 People v. Barondess, 61 Hun 571, 16 N. Y. Supp. 436 (1st Dept. 1891);
Davis v. Zimmerman, 91 Hun 481, 36 N. Y. Supp. 303 (1895) ; Kerbs v. Rosen-
stien, 56 App. Div. 619, 67 N. Y. Supp. 385 (1st Dept. 1900); Mills v. U. S.
Printing Co., 99 App. Div. 605, 91 N. Y. Supp. 185 (2d Dept. 1904) ; Rogers v.
Evarts, - Misc. -, 17 N. Y. Supp. 264 (1891).
3 Gilbert v. Mickle, 4 Sandf. Ch. 357 (N. Y. 1846) (defendant picketed
the plaintiff's auction rooms to warn strangers of mock auctions).
4 People v. Wilzig, 4 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 403 (1886) ; People v. Kostka, 4 N. Y.
Cr. Rep. 429 (1886).
5 Levy v. Rosenstein, 66 N. Y. Supp. 101 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
6 N. Y. Laws 1870, c. 19.
7 Two or more persons who conspire to prevent another from exercising a
lawful trade or calling, or by interfering or threatening to interfere with prop-
erty belonging to or used by another, or with the use or employment thereof,
are guilty of a misdemeanor.
8 Johnston Harvester Co. v. Meinhardt, 9 Abb. (N. C.) 393 (N. Y. 1880)
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